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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
A DISCUSSION OF ONE PHASE OF THE
PATENT LAW DEALING WITH RELA-
TIONSHIP OF EMPLOYER AND EM-
PLOYEE IN PATENT MATTERS
By ALBERT R. TEARE*
A question of frequent importance to the general law
practitioner, is the legal effect of the relation of employer and
employee concerning inventions made by the employee during his
employment. The question of ownership of inventions as well as
patents which may be granted on such inventions usually arises
after the inventions have been made. This is particularly
noticeable where the employer furnishes the material and equip-
ment necessary to develop the invention. Different phases of the
relationship arise: In cases wherein the employer conceives the
invention and hires the employee to carry out the general plan; in
cases wherein the employee is under a contract of general em-
ployment and the invention made by the employee is merely
incidental thereto; and in cases wherein the employee is hired
to devise specific improvements or devices for a stipulated
consideration.
Concerning the first relationship, that is, where the employee is
hired merely to carry out the invention of the employer, it may be
stated generally that where the employer has conceived the plan of
the invention and is engaged in experiments to perfect it, then no
suggestions from the employee not amounting to a new method of
arrangement, which in itself is'a complete invention, is sufficient to
deprive the employer of the exclusive right in the effected
improvement; but where the suggestions go to make up a com-
plete and perfected machine embracing the substance of all that is
embodied in the patent subsequently issued to the party to whom
the suggestions were made, the patent is invalid because the
invention and discovery belong to another. (Agawam Woolen
Company vs. Jordan 7 Wall 583.)
In the second case, that is under contracts of general employ-
ment where the employee is engaged to devote general services but
the inventions so made are merely incidntal to his employment, and
are developed upon the time and at the expense of the employer,
then the employer has a mere license (non exclusive and non
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transferable), while the invention and patent belong generally to
the employee (Hapgood vs. Heveitt in 9 U. S. 266). But where
there is an express contract appearing with sufficient certainty and
reasonably limited to the subject matter, giving such inventions
and patents to the employer, it is valid and will be specifically
enforced. (Mississippi Co. v. Franzen 143 Fed. 501).
This discussion, however, is directed toward the third case and
is intended to set forth the existing law which defines the rights
of the employer and employee, where the employees is under a
contract of employment, in which contract no provision is made
for assignment of patents, which may be obtained on inventions
developed during the course and within the scope of employment.
The question for determination then is, whether or not the
patent shall belong to the employer even though there is an
absence of an express stipulation to that effect. In this con-
nection, the recently reported case of Peck v. Standard Parts
Company 282 Fed. 443, -opinion by Judge Denison is of prime
importance.
Briefly, the facts in this case are that the Hess Pontiac Spring
and Axle Company was engaged in manufacturing springs for the
Ford, automobile, and desired automatic machinery for the manu-
facture of the front spring. Accordingly, a written contract was
entered into with a machine designer, William J. Peck. The body
of the contract set forth a consideration for services together
with a bonus for completion of the machinery at or within the
expiration of a certain time. The machinery was completed and
compensation paid. Later, the Pontiac Company was taken over
by the Standard Parts Company, whereupon Peck attempted to
obtain a satisfactory general contract with both the Pontiac and
Standard Parts Company. During such negotiations, a patent for
one of the machines was obtained by Peck. Subsequently,
negotiations for the contract failed and thereupon Peck brought
action for infringement. The defendant answered, relying wholly
upon its rights under the contract by virtue of which it claimed
an equitable right to the patent in suit, whereupon the answer
proceeded in the nature of a cross bill asking for a decree that
the plaintiff be compelled to convey the legal title to the patent.
The District Court sustained the defendant's position and made
a decree directing that, the patent be conveyed to the defendant.
Upon appeal, the case was reversed.
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The facts stated in the above case involved a contract to devise
a specific product in the course of employment. The Court, upon
consideration of the evidence stated the general rule of license
above referred to and then stated that the question for determina-
tion was whether or not there should be an exception to the rule
in cases of specific employment wherein there is an absence of any
stipulation or understanding that the patent should belong to the
employer. In other words, where under contracts of general
employment, the patent belongs to the employee, while the em-
ployer obtains merely a license, does it follow as a matter of law
that the patent belongs to the employer where the employee is
hired to devise one specific improvement?
To determine the reasonableness of the exception, the Court
resorted to an illustration of familiar cases. In the language of
the Court: (Page 447).
If a farm laborer had been employed specifically to build a wire fence
which would keep cattle out, and had hit upon the successful method of
attaching a barb, ought the employing farmer to have been entitled to the
barbed wire patent? If the superintendent of a mining company's stamp
mill had been directed to put his energies on finding a better plan of con-
centration to use in the company's work, and had hit upon the flotation
process, should the mining company be entitled to the patent? Nor, ie
there any hardship to the employer in denying that a contract to devise
a particular improvement conveys title to any resulting invention. If that
is the intent, it is easy to say so.
A further apt illustration was to the effect that if any employee
was hired to improve all of the articles in the employer's line of
manufacture, under the general rule above set forth in the Hap-
good case, title to any resulting patent would not pass to the
employer; but if the title passed when the employee was hired to
devise only one article or specific improvement, then what would
be the law about the agreement to try to improve some but not all
of the articles so manufactured? It is obvious therefore that
practical difficulties in the application of the law would immedi-
ately arise. Accordingly, the Court found no logical basis as well
as great practical difficulty in the application of the alleged ex-
ception and concluded that the exception cannot be proven unless
there is compelling authority to that effect. A review of the entire
field in which the Supreme Court had touched the subject as set
forth in the following cases was then disclosed.
The principal cases reviewed by the Court were:
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McClurg vs. Kingsland x How 202, 11 L. o2.
Hapgood vs. Hewitt ri9 U. S. 226, 7 Sup. Ct. 193.
Soloinons vs. United States 137 U. S. 342, Ix Sup. Ct. 88.
Dalzell v. Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. 149, U. S. 315, 13
Sup. Ct. 886.
Lane v. Locke 15o U. S. 193, 199 14 Sup. Ct. 78.
McAleer v. United States 15o U. S. 424, X4, Sup. Ct. z6o.
Gill vs. United States 16o U. S. 435, 16 Sup. Ct. 322.
In the Hapgood case, Hewitt was expressly employed to devote
his time and services to devising means in perfecting plows. Dur-
ing such employment he made an invention and it was held that
the title of the invention did not pass to the employer. Here, the
employment was for a particular thing under an express contract
of employment.
In the Solomons case, Clark was employed and assigned the
duty of devising an internal revenue stamp. He did devise a self-
cancelling stamp which was adopted. Later, however, after he
had obtained a patent, suit was brought for infringement against
the United States. About the only thing involved was the right
of the United States to use the stamp without paying royalty.
Accordingly the question of license rather than that of title to the
patent was at issue. In this case, Justice Brewer divided the
master and servant situation into two classes: "one, wherein there
is only a hiring for general service in which the facts may support
an inference of license, and the other, wherein there is a specific
hiring to devise an improvement in which the master's rights in
any resulting invention arise as a matter of law." The phrase
"arise as a matter of law" would seem to indicate that the master
was entitled to the invention and to any patents which may have
been granted therein. But, it is pointed out that the Solomons case
was in the Supreme Court on appeal from the Court of Claims
where it had been held that while the government did not obtain a
specific interest in the patent, so as to exclude other persons from
the use of it, nevertheless, it acquired the right to use the stamp
without liability to the inventor, and that it was this decision which
Justice Brewer was affirming. Accordingly, the language used
was construed to pertain only to a license and to be obiter so far
as the question of title was concerned.
In the Gill case, the only question involved was whether the
employer had a license. Justice Brown, however, in the opinion,
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referred to the Solomons case and said "in the case of specific
employment the patent belongs to the employer." This language,
however, was construed as not only being completely obiter in the
Gill case but even a misunderstanding of the Solomons case.
In the Dalzell case, Dalzell was specifically assigned to devise
means for perfecting an apparatus for making watch cores. In
this case, the company paid all expenses for obtaining a patent
which, however, was necessarily taken out in the inventor's name.
In the Circuit Court the patent was held to belong to the employer,
but the Supreme Court reversed this decision. In the opinion of
Justice Grey, the proposition was restated that the employer is not
entitled to the patent "in the absence of express agreement to that
effect."
In the McGlurg, Lane and McAleer cases, the question of
license only was involved, and accordingly the ownership of patent
rights under specific employment was not at issue.
Thus, Judge Denison disposed of all Supreme Court cases by
showing the denial of the exception in two cases (Hapgood and
Dueber), and showing the affirmation in only one case clearly
(Gill) and in another case, doubtfully (Solomons), but explaining
that the affirmations were irrelevant to the issue. Accordingly, the
weight of authority of the Supreme Court was shown beyond
dispute to deny exception.
The Court then referred to the National Box Company vs.
Healy 189 Fed. 49, 56, and to the Hansen case 137 Fed. 303.
Regarding the last mentioned case the Court says: "The Hansen
case has several times been cited approvingly on the general
proposition that there must be an expresse agreement to
assign ... "
In the National Box Case, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Seventh Circuit stated:
No matter what the contract of service may be-whether for ordinary
employment or for specific inventive work-the master cannot have title
to an invention of a servant, in the absence of an express contract to
assign it to him, although made in the course of the service and at the
master's expense.
The Court concluded then that "an invention does not belong
to the employer merely by virtue of the employment contract, as
well when that employment is to devise or improve a specific
thing as when the employment is to devise means generally in the
line of the employer's business."
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The Court stated further:
Outside of the face of the contract, there is no evidence a4 to the
intent of the parties at the time it was made, and we find no evidence of
subsequent conduct by the parties sufficient to indicate Peck's conscious
purpose that the title should pasg or establish an estoppel against him to
that extent.
The Peck vs. Standard Parts Company case, then defines the
law, for the Sixth Circuit, at least, that where there is no evidence
as to the intent of the parties at the time the specific express
contract was made, and there is no subsequent evidence of
estoppel, then the title to inventions made by the employee in the
course of the employment belongs to the employee, while the
employer obtains merely a non-transferable, non-exclusive license.
Accordingly, to protect an employer against the possibility of
future competition, every contract for employment whether
general or specific should contain an agreement to assign any
patents which may be obtained upon an invention made during the
course of the employment and within the scope of the employ-
ment.'
'Accord. Fuller Johnson Man. Co. v. Bartlett, 68 Wis. 73, 31 N. W. 47;
Valley Iron Works Co. v. Goodrick, 103 Wis. 436, 78 N. W. io96; Rowell
v. Rowell, 122 Wis. i, 2o, 99 N. W. 473.-Ed.
